How state support of religion shapes attitudes toward Muslim immigrants: New evidence from a sub-national comparison by Helbling, Marc & Traunmüller, Richard
www.ssoar.info
How state support of religion shapes attitudes
toward Muslim immigrants: New evidence from a
sub-national comparison
Helbling, Marc; Traunmüller, Richard
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Dieser Beitrag ist mit Zustimmung des Rechteinhabers aufgrund einer (DFG geförderten) Allianz- bzw. Nationallizenz
frei zugänglich. / This publication is with permission of the rights owner freely accessible due to an Alliance licence and
a national licence (funded by the DFG, German Research Foundation) respectively.
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Helbling, M., & Traunmüller, R. (2016). How state support of religion shapes attitudes toward Muslim immigrants:
New evidence from a sub-national comparison. Comparative political studies, 49(3), 391-424. https://
doi.org/10.1177/0010414015612388
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
econstor
Make Your Publications Visible.
A Service of
zbw Leibniz-InformationszentrumWirtschaftLeibniz Information Centrefor Economics
Helbling, Marc; Traunmüller, Richard
Article  —  Published Version
How state support of religion shapes attitudes toward
Muslim immigrants: New evidence from a sub-
national comparison
Comparative political studies
Provided in Cooperation with:
WZB Berlin Social Science Center
Suggested Citation: Helbling, Marc; Traunmüller, Richard (2016) : How state support of religion
shapes attitudes toward Muslim immigrants: New evidence from a sub-national comparison,
Comparative political studies, ISSN 1552-3829, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, Vol. 49, Iss. 3, pp.
391-424,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414015612388
This Version is available at:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/171965
Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen
Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle
Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich
machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.
Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen
(insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten,
gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort
genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.
Terms of use:
Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your
personal and scholarly purposes.
You are not to copy documents for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them
publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise
use the documents in public.
If the documents have been made available under an Open
Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you
may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated
licence.
www.econstor.eu
Comparative Political Studies
2016, Vol. 49(3) 391 –424
© The Author(s) 2015
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav 
DOI: 10.1177/0010414015612388
cps.sagepub.com
Article
How State Support 
of Religion Shapes 
Attitudes Toward 
Muslim Immigrants: New 
Evidence From a Sub-
National Comparison
Marc Helbling1,2 and Richard Traunmüller3
Abstract
This article argues that governments play a considerable role in shaping 
citizens’ attitudes toward Muslim immigrants through the way they regulate 
religion. European democracies are far from secular, and matters of religious 
regulation cannot be reduced to abstract values or constitutional clauses. 
Under conditions of high state support of religion, accommodating new 
religious minorities involves not only the changing of existing rules but 
also giving up on long-standing traditions and everyday habits. As a result, 
citizens see religious newcomers as a threat to their way of life and react 
with animosity to their practices and demands. We support our argument 
by combining newly designed survey items with original data on religious 
regulation in 26 Swiss cantons. Our findings contradict the extant literature 
and have important implications for the democratic challenges in Europe, 
the quality of modern immigration societies, and the role of religion in 
democracy more generally.
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Introduction
“Swiss Ban Building of Minarets on Mosques” was the headline that appeared 
in the New York Times on November 30, 2009. One day earlier, in what could 
be called the first ever anti-Islam referendum in Europe, a majority of the 
Swiss population voted in favor of this ban, triggering strong reactions from 
across the globe (Fetzer & Soper, 2012; Vatter, 2011). About 4 years later, in 
September 2013, the citizens of the Italian-speaking canton of Ticino decided 
in yet another referendum to ban the wearing of the burqa in public spaces. It 
is not without irony that the Swiss case, whose successful accommodation of 
religious differences was long held as exemplary by the classics of compara-
tive politics (Deutsch, 1976; Lijphart, 1977), now serves as a striking illustra-
tion for the new political conflict over Muslim immigration and the 
accommodation of minority religious practices all over Western Europe. Why 
do so many citizens in European democracies fear Muslim immigration, dis-
like Muslims’ religious practices, and oppose their religious rights? Few 
questions are more pressing for our understanding of the thorny public policy 
challenges in Europe, the quality of modern immigrant societies, and the role 
of religion in democracy more generally.
Looking at political contexts, this article offers a new explanation and 
argues that governments play a considerable role in shaping citizens’ attitudes 
toward the Muslim minority through the way they regulate religion. By rely-
ing on close cooperative relations between the state and the religious majority 
and by implementing institutions of state support for the dominant religious 
tradition, governments contribute to a sense of religious–cultural identity 
among citizens that ultimately shapes attitudes toward Muslims and their reli-
gious practices. To see this, it is important to realize that counter to conven-
tional belief European democracies are far from secular (Driessen, 2010; Fox, 
2006, 2008) and that matters of state support of religion cannot be reduced to 
an abstract set of values or constitutional clauses (Fox & Flores, 2009; Gill, 
2008). Institutions of state support of religion are not only widespread in 
Western Europe but also are a significant and tangible element of the public 
life and collective identities of its citizens. State support of religion comprises 
a whole array of different regulations and policies ranging from the public 
identification with religious symbols and traditional customs, over religious 
education in public schools, to very concrete forms of financial subsidies for 
religious organizations (Fox, 2008, 2011, 2013; Grim & Finke, 2006).
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These institutional settings are important because when the political, 
social, and cultural life of a public is defined by strong references to religious 
tradition, religious minorities pose a direct threat to this collective identity. 
Their practices are not easily accommodated because this would entail a loss 
in what is essentially perceived a zero-sum game. Under institutional condi-
tions of state support of religion, accommodating new religious minorities 
involves the changing of existing rules as well as the loss of long-standing 
traditions, valuable privileges, and maybe even everyday habits. Not only do 
many citizens prefer the status quo and are uncomfortable with change 
(Crandall & Eidelman, 2012), they will also see religious newcomers as a 
threat to their way of life and react with animosity to their practices and 
demands. In contrast, where governments are more neutral or removed from 
majority religion and public life is less pervaded by religious tradition, less 
changes to the institutional status quo are necessary; citizens have only little 
to lose and are less likely to see religious minorities as threat or competitors. 
Accordingly, citizens will be more tolerant and accommodating toward the 
Muslim minority.
We support the predictions of our theory, which contradicts and expands 
existing arguments in the literature on immigration (Fetzer & Soper, 2005; 
Helbling, 2014; Koopmans, 2013), studies on religious discrimination (Fox 
& Akbaba, 2013, 2014), and the economics of religion (Grim & Finke, 2007, 
2011), by combining two data sources in the controlled setting of a sub-
national comparison. First, we draw on newly designed survey items that 
capture citizens’ attitudes toward Muslim immigrants, the wearing of heads-
carves, and the building of minarets that were for the first time included in the 
2011 wave of the Swiss Electoral Studies (SELECTS; Lutz, 2012). Second, 
we make use of another completely new data set that provides indicators of 
religious regulation for the 26 Swiss cantons and is based on the coding 
scheme of the international Religion and the State Project (RAS) developed 
by Fox (2008, 2011). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first application 
of RAS-type indicators at the sub-national level. Combining these two data 
sources allows us to study citizens in their political contexts and to relate 
individual attitudes toward Muslims to a wide range of institutions of state 
support of religion while holding constant potentially confounding factors—
most importantly, the specific context of Muslim immigration.
Our results are based on Bayesian hierarchical-ordered probit models and 
show that citizens living in political contexts with higher levels of state sup-
port of religion are more likely to think that there are too many Muslims in 
the country and that the building of minarets should be banned. Results for 
attitudes on Muslim women’s right to wear headscarves in public point in a 
similar direction. Indeed, church–state relations are more important for our 
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understanding of citizens’ attitude toward Muslims than general integration 
policy or the actual number of Muslims in the canton. These effects stem 
largely from policies that relate to the upholding of collective identity and are 
highly visible to ordinary citizens (such as public religious symbols, religious 
holidays, religious education in public schools, or church taxes) as compared 
with the economics of religion’s more traditional focus on finances and sub-
sidies which, while crucial for religious organizations, hardly affect the peo-
ple’s sense of religious–cultural identity.
Our article contributes to the recent growth in scholarly interest in public 
attitudes toward immigrants in general and Muslim immigrants in particular 
(see Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014 for a recent review). Although a series of 
studies has sought to explain attitudes toward Muslims (e.g., Kalkan, Layman, 
& Uslaner, 2009; Saroglou, Lamkaddem, van Pachterbeke, & Buxant, 2009; 
Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007; Stolz, 2005; Strabac & Listhaug, 2008; Van 
der Noll, 2010), they tend to focus on individual characteristics and refer to 
theories explaining resentment toward immigrants in general. Our article 
advances a more specific argument to understand opposition toward Muslim 
immigrants by stressing the religious–cultural nature of this political conflict 
(see also Helbling, 2012; Koopmans, 2013). By focusing on the political con-
texts of religious regulation, we go beyond studies that have investigated the 
effects of the economic or demographic contexts such as unemployment and 
immigration rates (Hopkins, 2010; Kunovich, 2004; McLaren, 2010; 
Meuleman, Davidov, & Billiet, 2009; Quillian, 1995; Strabac & Listhaug, 
2008) as well as to more recent work on the role of political institutions or 
integration regimes (Weldon, 2006; Wright, 2011; Wright & Bloemraad, 
2012). We show that, in general, religious regulation is a better predictor of 
citizens’ anti-Muslim sentiment than the number of Muslim immigrants or 
integration policy.
This finding also suggests that recent re-evaluations of the public role of 
religion and its compatibility with democracy may have been too sanguine 
(Driessen, 2010). Even benevolent forms of religious regulation may have 
unintended consequences by shaping citizens’ attitudes which are detrimental 
to liberal understandings of democracy. Our study, thus, complements the 
findings of cross-national studies on religious discrimination (Fox & Akbaba, 
2013, 2014) that based on macro-data also relate state support of religion to 
higher levels of discrimination, by providing a potential micro-foundation 
and presenting new survey-based evidence for this link.
The consistency with the cross-national religious discrimination litera-
ture supports the generalizability of our results from a sub-national compari-
son of the Swiss cantons. Sub-national variation in state support of religion 
exists in several states facing the challenges of Muslim immigration. For 
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instance, the public law status of religious organizations and other forms of 
religious regulation differ across the 16 federal states of Germany. Public 
funding of religious education varies across the Canadian provinces and ter-
ritories. Even in France, financial support of religion depends on regional 
specificities as is exemplified by the special status of Alsace-Loraine. We 
expect our results to directly speak to these and similar cases with sub-
national variation in church–state relations. But given the fact that the extent 
of the sub-national variation we observe in Switzerland is comparable with 
cross-national variation in Western Europe (see below) and the fact that our 
results are in accordance with cross-national studies on religious discrimina-
tion, they may well be generalizable to cross-national settings and help us 
understand more broadly the institutional roots of citizens’ attitudes toward 
Muslim immigrants.
Theory
Cultural Threat and the Explanation of Anti-Immigrant 
Sentiment
The main explanation for anti-immigrant sentiments put forward in the litera-
ture is that immigrants are perceived as a competitive threat to the host soci-
ety (Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958; Quillian, 1995).1 The scholarly debate 
mainly revolves around the question whether this threat is best understood 
either in terms of economic resources or cultural identities, with a tendency 
to favor the latter (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007, 2010; Hainmueller & 
Hopkins, 2014; Sides & Citrin, 2007; Tingley, 2013). Whereas economic 
concerns subsume fears over increased labor market competition as well as 
strains on social security systems, cultural concerns evolve around issues of 
national identity, shared values, and social cohesion that may be threatened 
by immigrants. More recently, several scholars have developed more specific 
cultural threat arguments to explain negative attitudes toward Muslim immi-
grants to Europe whose traditional religiosity and cultural beliefs on gender 
roles or sexuality are often considered incompatible with the liberal and secu-
lar lifestyles in these countries (e.g., Helbling, 2014; Saroglou et al., 2009; 
Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007; Van der Noll, 2010).
Our theoretical argument builds and expands on these perspectives. Like 
others before us, we stress the fundamental role of cultural threat in our 
explanation for anti-Muslim attitudes. And like others, we also argue that 
Muslim immigrants’ religious practices and claims for religious rights are the 
decisive features of this particular group that trigger the feelings of cultural 
threat in citizens of the host society. Where we depart from previous 
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explanations in the literature is in some of the basic assumptions concerning 
the host societies, the exact mechanisms we belief to be at work and, as a 
result, in the empirical predictions we derive. We place political institutions 
of religious regulation at the center of our theory and argue that these institu-
tional contexts determine the extent to which Muslims’ religious practices 
and claims for religious rights are perceived as threat and Muslim immigrants 
resented.
Up to now, the group threat hypothesis has been operationalized on the 
contextual level by relying on either demographic or economic characteris-
tics of regions or nations, such as the inflow of immigrants or the general 
economic situation (e.g., Dancygier & Donnelly, 2014; Ha, 2010; Hopkins, 
2010, 2011; McLaren, 2003; Schlueter & Davidov, 2013; Strabac, 2011; 
Manevska & Achterberg, 2013; Newman, 2013). With regard to genuinely 
political factors, some studies have looked at the effects of welfare state 
regimes on attitudes toward immigrants (Facchini & Mayda, 2009; Hanson, 
Scheve, & Slaughter, 2007; van Oorschot & Uunk, 2007), and more recently, 
researchers have started to explain attitudes toward immigrants by investigat-
ing the effects of citizenship and integration policies (Ceobanu & Escandell, 
2011; Kesler & Bloemraad, 2010; Pehrson, Vignoles, & Brown, 2009; 
Schlueter, Meuleman, & Davidov, 2013; Weldon, 2006; Wright, 2011; Wright 
& Bloemraad, 2012). Our study will also consider these alternative explana-
tions by incorporating indicators of religious demography and general immi-
grant integration policies in our statistical models below. However, we will 
demonstrate that these alternative factors are only of limited use in account-
ing for the variation in anti-Muslim sentiments.
Institutions of Public Life and Collective Identities are Far From 
Secular
Existing research has only partly accounted for the specific challenges which 
arise from Muslim immigration and the related controversial political debates 
on the Muslim headscarf and religious buildings like mosques or minarets 
(Bowen, 2007; Joppke, 2009; Thomas, 2006). What makes Muslim immigra-
tion unique is that Western democracies must now deal with new religious 
customs and immigrants’ claims for the accommodation of religious rights. 
These new religious claims must now “be accommodated within preexisting 
normative understandings and institutional arrangements of state–church 
relations that have crystallized in nationally specific ways from centuries of 
demarcation struggles between states and Christian churches” (Fetzer & 
Soper, 2005; Koopmans, 2013, p. 165).
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In our theory, we follow up on these theoretical intuitions by focusing on 
the political context of the regulation of religion. We argue that irrespective 
of changes in religious demography and general policy approaches to immi-
grant integration, it is the institutional arrangements of state support of reli-
gion, that is, the friendliness or identification of the state with a religious 
tradition (Durham, 1996), which shape the views citizens have toward 
Muslim immigration and the accommodation of the their religious rights. 
Political institutions define the rules of the game of public life and embody 
the shared cultural norms on which collective identities are built (Hall, 1986; 
Thelen & Steinmo, 1992). To understand under what institutional conditions 
Muslim immigration is perceived as threat, we need to better understand (a) 
the nature of these institutions, (b) how people in the receiving societies 
relate to them, and (c) how they are challenged by Muslim’s claims for reli-
gious rights. From these theoretical building blocks, we will be able to derive 
clear predictions about the impact of state support of religion on citizens’ 
attitudes toward Muslim immigration which contradict previous arguments 
in the literature (Fetzer & Soper, 2005; Helbling, 2014; Koopmans, 2013).
We argue that, in general, the supposed “secularism” of European liberal 
democracy, both in terms of the rules of the game of public life and of collec-
tive identities, has been grossly overstated in the literature. Instead, we 
believe that the reason why Muslim religious practices threaten the collective 
identities in European host societies is precisely because the latter are deeply 
rooted in religious traditions. Recent empirical studies show that the institu-
tional reality of European democracies is indeed far from “secular” and that 
quite to the contrary institutions of state support of religion are in fact well-
developed, widespread, and an integral element of public life in most 
European societies (Driessen, 2010; Fox, 2006, 2008, 2013).
It is important to stress that we are not saying that European publics are 
“religious” in terms of active religious practice or beliefs. What we are saying 
is that collective identities and institutions of public life are intimately related 
to historical religious traditions and are now shared by citizens regardless of 
whether they consider themselves to be religious or not. In the words of 
Norris and Inglehart (2004), “although only 5% of the Swedish public attends 
church weekly, the Swedish public as a whole manifests a distinctive 
Protestant value system that they hold in common with citizens of other 
Protestant societies” (p. 17). Importantly, these collective identities “are not 
transmitted primarily by the church, but by the educational system and the 
mass media” (Norris & Inglehart, 2004, p. 17; see also Inglehart & Baker, 
2000). These are important channels through which political socialization 
and democratic learning takes place (Almond & Verba, 1963) and through 
which people internalize the role that religious symbols and traditions play in 
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their society. Citizens’ sense of collective identity is further reinforced 
through their repeated experience and contact with the institutions that struc-
ture considerable parts of public life.
Conceptualizing State–Church Relations as Degrees of 
Regulation
Understanding how citizens relate to institutions of religious regulation and 
thus the effects of state support of religion on citizens’ attitudes, further 
requires that we move beyond crude legal typologies or abstract theoretic 
models and focus on what states actually do (Bader, 2007; Enyedi, 2003; 
Fox, 2008; Minkenberg, 2002; Traunmüller & Freitag, 2011). Contrary to 
common practice in political theory and qualitative case studies, church–state 
relations are not adequately captured by a mere dichotomy distinguishing one 
ideal type, for example, established religion, from another ideal type, for 
example, separation of church and state. Rather, they present a complex and 
multifaceted set of official laws, policies, and administrative actions that aim 
to regulate the activities of religious groups and individuals.
Viewing state–church relations in terms of religious regulation gives a 
more adequate description of empirical reality. An instructive case is France, 
which in scholarly and political debate usually serves as the ideal type of a 
laicist regime with a strict separation of religion and the state (e.g., Fetzer & 
Soper, 2005). In reality, however, state support of religion in France clearly 
exceeds what most would consider a strictly secularist policy as the state 
subsidizes religious schools, hospitals, and buildings (Fox, 2008; Kuru, 2009; 
Madeley, 2003). Ironically, France scores higher on measures of government 
favoritism and state funding of religion than the United Kingdom (Grim & 
Finke, 2006), which often serves as an ideal type for a state–church system. 
Indeed, de jure constitutional clauses and principles are largely unrelated to 
the de facto extent that governments identify with and support religion in 
practice (Fox & Flores, 2009) and therefore how religious tradition pervades 
the public life in a country and the everyday experience of its citizens.
How Accommodation Changes Religious Regulation and Shapes 
Citizens’ Attitudes
Conceptualizing state support of religion in gradual terms as religious regula-
tion not only captures the empirical complexity more adequately than do 
abstract legal categories and typologies. It also allows us to describe political 
contexts as a continuum in terms of the extent of regulation or the amount of 
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state support. This lets us more readily connect religious policy with the con-
sequences of Muslim immigration and the attitudes of the people living 
within these political contexts. As state support can now be conceived of in 
terms of more or less, changes in religious policy toward accommodation of 
religious minorities are readily expressed in terms of gains and losses. If we 
want to understand people’s reaction to Muslim immigration, we must 
acknowledge that just as Muslim immigrants demand the right to live their 
religious traditions, members of the host society, too, value their existing 
institutions and cultural traditions. Changing existing rules to fit Muslim 
demands for religious rights to a considerable degree involves the changing 
of traditions that are an integral part of people’s collective identity. To the 
citizens, it is perfectly rational to want to preserve them and to resist what 
they view as a loss.
Figure 1 illustrates how, according to our theory, the institutional status 
quo of state support of religion determines the extent to which Muslim immi-
grants’ claims for religious accommodation are perceived as loss for citizens 
in host societies. It also lays open the key assumptions on which our argu-
ment rests: (a) State support of religion is conceived of as uni-dimensional 
continuum of unequal treatment of religious groups that results from govern-
ment favoritism and identification with the majority religion and (b) the 
Figure 1. Illustration of the theoretical argument that the degree of institutional 
state support of religion determines the extent to which the accommodation of 
Muslims’ religious rights is perceived as threat by citizens.
Changing religious rights for Muslim immigrants from the status quo to more accommodation 
leads to a greater decrease in state support for the majority in Context A (where state 
support is high) than in Context B (where state support is low). These differences in the 
decrease of state support correspond to differences in expected loss and perceived threat, 
and as a consequence, the rejection of Muslim immigrants and their religious practices.
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accommodation of religious minority rights corresponds to reducing this 
unequal treatment. Changes in religious policy are therefore essentially per-
ceived as zero-sum games, were the majority loses what the minority gains. 
Finally, we also assume (c) that feelings of threat and rejection of Muslim 
immigrants’ claims are more or less proportional to the loss expected from 
accommodating their religious needs.
This simple theory allows to explain variations in anti-Muslim sentiment 
by referring to the institutional contexts in which citizens find themselves. 
Expanding religious rights for Muslim immigrants by leaving the status quo 
and moving toward the accommodation of Muslim claims means moving 
down the y axis of state support for the majority. The exact same religious 
claims by Muslims would lead to greater loss of privileges in Context A than 
in Context B and thus result in more rejection in Context A than in Context B. 
In fact, citizens in Condition A will always experience more loss than citizens 
in Condition B no matter what degree of religious equality is claimed by 
Muslim immigrants as, by assumption, accommodation in Context B will not 
move further up the y axis (i.e., Muslim seek to lower the unequal treatment 
by the state). Note that this assumption is compatible with the view of institu-
tions of religious regulation as opportunity structures which define what 
claims can reasonably be made by new religious groups (Fetzer & Soper, 
2005; Koopmans & Statham, 1999).
Correcting and Expanding Predictions on the Relation Between 
Religious Regulation and Religious Minority Rights
Although we believe our theoretical argument to be straightforward, it both 
contradicts and expands existing views on the role of religious regulation for 
the accommodation of Muslim rights. Most notably, in an influential study on 
Muslims in Europe, Fetzer and Soper (2005) posited the exact reverse rela-
tionship between religious regulation and the accommodation of Muslim reli-
gious rights: “Some states have more easily accommodated these religious 
needs than others because they have well-developed relations between politi-
cal and religious institutions” (p. 20). The reason for this competing predic-
tion, they argue, is that the public of the receiving society is more amenable 
to claims for religious rights of minorities in institutional contexts that are 
friendly toward religion in general. Systems of strict separation of church and 
state, however, view new religious demands as illegitimate and thus produce 
intolerance toward Muslims’ religious practices.
The few empirical studies which have followed this lead and looked at the 
effects of state–church regimes on individual attitudes reach inconclusive 
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results. We believe this is because they conceptualize state–church regime in 
reference to legal typologies instead of religious regulation and suffer from 
important data limitations as they rely only on an extremely small number of 
countries. For three countries, Fetzer and Soper (2005) looked at the impact 
of state–church regimes on attitudes toward Muslim religious practices with-
out, however, finding any relationship. Van der Noll (2010) showed in her 
study on four Western European countries that attitudes are more negative in 
France with a (supposedly) clear separation between state and church than, 
for example, in Great Britain with its (supposed) state–church system. 
Ironically, this study delivers the right results but gives the wrong reasons. As 
we have briefly commented above, actual government favoritism is in fact 
higher in France than it is in Great Britain. According to our theory, we would 
expect France to be less tolerant than Great Britain—but not because the 
former is laicist and the latter has a state church, but because actual govern-
ment favoritism for the majority religion is higher in France than in Great 
Britain. In his study with six Western European countries, Helbling (2014) 
found a similar effect when it comes to attitudes toward the Muslim heads-
carf. He found, however, no effect for general attitudes toward Muslim 
immigrants.
Challenging existing arguments in the literature, we predict that citizens 
are more likely to oppose Muslim immigration and the accommodation of 
Muslim religious rights in political contexts that are characterized by a strong 
identification of state and religious culture. This prediction is in line with 
cross-national studies on religious discrimination (Fox & Akbaba, 2013, 
2014) and expands the arguments of the religious economy model by Grim 
and Finke (2007, 2011) who also argued that religious regulation leads to 
more social hostilities toward religious minorities. However, their argument 
focuses (a) on restrictive policies toward minority religion and (b) on the 
strategic behavior of religious organizations and elites. We show that even 
beneficial and well-intended policies of religious support for the religious 
majority may have unintended negative consequences for religious minori-
ties. Moreover, we argue that religious regulation not only defines the oppor-
tunity structure for religious organizations but also directly affects the general 
public and shapes its attitudes toward religious minorities. These effects stem 
largely from policies that relate to the upholding of a collective identity and 
are highly visible to ordinary citizens (such as public religious symbols, reli-
gious holidays, religious education in public schools, or church taxes) as 
compared with the economics of religion’s more traditional focus on finances 
and subsidies which, while crucial for religious organizations, hardly affect 
the people’s sense of religious–cultural identity. In this sense, our argument 
provides a micro-foundation for cross-national studies which finds that states 
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that support the majority religion through religious legislation are more likely 
to engage in religious discrimination (Fox & Akbaba, 2013, 2014).
Two more specific propositions also follow from our theoretical argu-
ment. First, because our theory stresses the tangible nature of institutions of 
state support of religion, we expect that the more visible cultural and sym-
bolic aspects of state support of religion will be more harmful for religious 
tolerance than purely economic ones. Although the latter aspects are without 
doubt important to religious organizations and religious elites, citizens in 
general are likely to be more concerned with religious symbols on flags and 
in public buildings, religious holidays, customs, and festivals as well as with 
what their children learn and eat in school. It is also these aspects where 
accommodation amounts to a zero-sum affair, for example, the removal of 
Christian symbols from public buildings, the rededication of religious holi-
days and festivals, or the banning of certain foods from school menus. 
Second, as we regard institutions of state support of religion to be part of the 
general collective identity within a polity, we expect that more state support 
of religion will lead to less tolerant attitudes among all citizens, regardless of 
their actual religiosity in terms of religious involvement and beliefs.
Data and Method
A Sub-National Comparison of the Swiss Case
So far, quantitative comparative studies have been hampered by the simple 
fact that large international surveys usually include no questions on issues 
related to Muslim immigrants and their religious practices. Our solution to 
this lack of cross-national comparative data is to turn to the sub-national 
comparative method (Snyder, 2001) and to investigate a federal state, where 
such survey data are available and where religious matters are regulated at 
the state level. At the same time, this will allow us to increase the number of 
cases and also to hold constant and, thus, eliminate potentially confounding 
factors in the explanation of attitudes toward Muslims.
Most importantly, it allows us to deal with a difficult problem in cross-
national comparison and to hold constant the specific context of Muslim 
immigration, that is, the main countries of origin and ethnic background of 
Muslim immigrants, the social and historical conditions of Muslim immi-
gration, and consequently the challenges to the integration and accommoda-
tion of this immigrant group. The vast majority of Muslims in Switzerland 
are descendants of migrant workers from the Balkans and from Turkey who 
came to Switzerland for purely economic reasons in the 1960s, followed by 
a wave of family reunion in the second half of the 1970s (Gianni, 2005).2 
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The initial labor immigration was considered a temporary phenomenon to 
counter the labor shortage. The political necessity to socially integrate this 
immigrant group and to accommodate their religious rights arose from the 
fact that, instead of returning to their countries of origin, these immigrants 
and their families decided to stay permanently and now live in Switzerland 
already in the second or third generation. This new situation puts issues of 
religious regulation and the accommodation of Muslim religious practices 
(notably not only in schools but also other public institutions) on the politi-
cal agenda.
But investigating sub-national units is not simply a methodological fix or 
second-best solution. In fact, it may also be substantively more appropriate to 
study immigration issues at the sub-national than the national level. Although 
the nation-state has constituted the main unit of analyses for a long time, 
more recently, the sub-national level is considered the most relevant context, 
as this is the place where immigrants integrate and interact with natives 
(Caponio & Borkert, 2010; Penninx, Kraal, Martinello, & Vertovec, 2004).
Switzerland constitutes a good case for the study of the effects of different 
state–church regulations across a large number of settings because of its pro-
nounced federalism and the large degrees of autonomy afforded to the 26 
Swiss cantons (Kriesi & Trechsel, 2008). Although there are minimal regula-
tions at the federal level, it is the cantons that are primarily entitled to regu-
late religious matters (Hafner & Gremmelspacher, 2005). Despite the fact 
that in all cantons, Christian churches (and in some instances Jewish com-
munities) are publicly recognized, we observe a large range of regulations, 
comparable with the variation we observe across Western European countries 
(see below). In some French-speaking cantons, for instance, Christian 
churches are organized as private associations and do not constitute public 
legal bodies which resemble the laicist model in France. In other cantons, the 
churches are best described as state churches comparable with the situation in 
many Scandinavian countries (Hafner & Gremmelspacher, 2005). In between, 
religious regulations such as religious education in school, collections of 
church taxes, or financial support vary considerably across cantons.
Measuring State Support of Religion
The central explanatory variable of our analysis, state support of religion, 
comprises a tangled mix of different regulations as well as direct and indirect 
forms of payment and subsidies. To operationalize this dimension of reli-
gious regulation, we draw on data for the 26 Swiss Cantons. The data are 
based on the coding scheme of the second round of the RAS (Fox, 2008, 
2011). The RAS indices are currently the most comprehensive and 
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convincing measures of government regulation of religion (Traunmüller, 
2012), and the new data set provides these measures for the Swiss sub-
national level for the period 2003-2011.
The Religious Support Index consists of a total of 51 binary items that 
cover various privileges as well as legal and material support afforded to 
organized religion by the government (Fox, 2011). As this measurement 
instrument was designed to capture religious policy on a global scale, it 
includes state practices that range from church taxes and funding of religious 
organizations to the actual implementation of religious precepts, such as 
dietary laws, restrictions on sexual behavior, and forms of criminal punish-
ment. However, in the case of the Swiss cantons in 2011, empirically, we only 
observe 17 of those different religious policies included in this index as a 
large number of the items concern particular aspects that are of relevance 
only outside the Western world (see Table 1 in the online appendix).
Out of these 17 items, six policies are in place in all of the cantons, namely, 
blasphemy laws protecting the majority as well as minority religions, manda-
tory closing of business during religious holidays, free air time for religious 
organizations on television or radio, the presence of an official department 
for religious affairs, and the listing of religious identity on government docu-
ments. Two, further, very common forms of state support of religion are reli-
gious education in public schools and the funding of religious buildings 
which we observe in no less than 24 of the 26 Swiss cantons. In 16 cantons, 
the government also collects church taxes. There is considerable sub-national 
variation in other forms of financial support of religion, that is, the funding of 
religious education in colleges or universities (nine cantons) as well as reli-
gious primary or secondary schools (six), salaries of clergy (eight), financial 
support of religious charitable organizations including hospitals (seven), and 
“other” funding (eight). The canton of Valais further provides direct grants to 
religious organizations. Finally, six cantons place additional restrictions on 
activities during religious holidays (so-called “blue laws”) and exhibit reli-
gious symbols on their flags, respectively.
Following Fox (2008, 2011), we form the Religious Support Index by 
combining all items in an additive index without weighting. But to be sure, 
we will extensively discuss potential validity issues concerning this index 
in the Robustness and Further Analyses section. As the sub-national institu-
tions of state support of religion have remained extremely stable between 
2003 and 2011, we rely on the 2011 scores (the year of the survey) in our 
analyses. Across the 26 cantons, the Religious Support Index ranges from 
scores between 8 (Geneva) and 14 (Appenzell-Innerrhoden and Obwalden; 
see Figure 2 for an illustration of the sub-national variation). As a reference 
and to put this range in a broader context, we should note that the empirical 
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variation among European democracies (i.e., EU27 plus Iceland and 
Norway) is between 5 (Austria, Netherlands, Latvia) and 18 points (Iceland) 
and thus somewhat larger. Still, in terms of index scores, our sub-national 
comparison of the Swiss cantons is roughly like comparing disparate 
nations such as France and Luxembourg (8) with Spain, Sweden, and 
Poland (13) or with Germany and Greece (15).3
Measuring Individual Attitudes Toward Muslims
To measure attitudes toward Muslims, we use survey data from the 2011 
wave of the SELECTS (Lutz, 2012). This survey included items on attitudes 
toward Muslims, the Muslim headscarf, and minarets that we will use as 
dependent variables (see Table 2 in the online appendix). So far, most studies 
have looked at attitudes toward either Muslims, religious practices such as 
wearing the headscarf, or Islamic schools (for Switzerland, see Christmann, 
Danaci, & Krömler, 2011; Hirter & Vatter, 2010; Stolz, 2005; Vatter, Milic, & 
Hirter, 2011). We believe that we need to investigate both aspects at the same 
time because controversies over Muslim immigration focus not only on the 
group itself but explicitly on their religious practices and symbols.
The original survey sample consisted of 4,391 respondents who are nested 
in 26 cantons and participated in a telephone survey (computer assisted tele-
phone interview [CATI]). Small cantons were over-sampled to ensure that 
there are at least 100 respondents in each canton. The survey took place over 
Figure 2. State support of religion in the 26 Swiss cantons 2011.
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the period of 3 weeks after the national elections in October/November 2011. 
Out of this first survey, 2,489 respondents agreed to fill in a paper question-
naire with additional questions. We will use the reduced sample as two of our 
three dependent variables have been included in the paper questionnaire. 
Detailed analyses with the immigration items that have been included in the 
full sample have shown that the reduced and full samples lead to the same 
results.
Respondents have been asked whether there are too many Muslim immi-
grants in Switzerland; whether in Switzerland, Muslim women should have 
the right to wear a religious headscarf in public; and whether in Switzerland, 
Muslims should have the right to construct minarets. For each question, 
respondents could choose between the following five answer categories: 
fully agree, partly agree, neither/nor, partly disagree, and fully disagree. See 
Table 2 in the online appendix for exact question wordings.
Figure 3 gives a first descriptive impression of attitudes toward Muslims 
across the whole of Switzerland. Almost a quarter (24%) of all Swiss agree 
with the statement that “there are too many Muslims in Switzerland,” 12% 
even “totally.” Although the majority (57%) does not share this view, and a 
further fifth (20%) is undecided on this issue, it is nonetheless a considerable 
part of the population that holds reservations toward Muslims. Interestingly, 
the attitudes toward the religious rights of Muslims are more polarized with 
more respondents taking sides and fewer neutral answers. Although the right 
of Muslim women to wear their headscarves in public is again supported by 
a majority of almost 57% of all Swiss, more than a third (35%) oppose it. This 
makes the headscarf a slightly more contentious issue than the right to con-
struct minarets which finds support from almost two thirds (61%) and is 
opposed by 30% of the Swiss population. Again, these numbers clearly indi-
cate a rejection of Muslims that is widely held in Swiss society. However, 
there is also considerable sub-national variation in attitudes toward Muslims 
and their religious practices.
Controls
At the contextual level, we take into account alternative explanations and 
control for the percentage of Muslims in the population and the general inte-
gration regime. The latter allows us to replicate earlier studies which primar-
ily looked at the effect of integration policies and to compare the strengths of 
the integration regulations with the more specific regulations of religious 
issues. To measure integration regimes, we use a cantonal policy index devel-
oped by Manatschal (2011) that covers the years 2004 to 2008. This index 
includes some of the items of the Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX; 
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Huddleston & Niessen, 2011) and the Indices of Citizenship Rights for 
Migrants (ICRI; Koopmans, Michalowski, & Waibel, 2012; Koopmans, 
Statham, Giugni, & Passy, 2005). Similar to our index on government regula-
tion of religion, we thus use an index that has been used so far to compare 
national regulations to study cantonal policies. Adapted to the Swiss context, 
the index by Manatschal (2011) measures civic-political, socio-structural, 
and cultural/religious rights of immigrants as well as requirements for family 
reunification and anti-discrimination regulations.4 As Manatschal and 
Stadelmann-Steffen (2013) showed, the policy variation at the cantonal level 
is substantial and comparable with the variation across Western European 
countries.5
Figure 3. Attitudes toward Muslims in Switzerland.
Own calculation based on SELECTS 2011. Error bars refer to plus/minus one standard error. 
SELECTS = Swiss Electoral Studies.
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On the individual level, we include socio-demographics such as gender, 
age, and education along with measures of left–right ideology, closeness to 
the conservative/right wing Swiss People’s Party (SVP), urban versus rural 
living area, as well as church attendance and religious denomination (none, 
Protestant, Catholic, Other). We therefore control for the most relevant con-
founding variables in the xenophobia and Islamophobia literature (Fetzer, 
2000; Helbling, 2012; Stolz, 2005; Vatter et al., 2011). See Table 2 in the 
online appendix for question wordings and coding details and Table 3 for 
summary statistics of all variables.
Potential Threats to Inference
The goal of our analysis is to demonstrate that there is a clear empirical 
correspondence between what citizens think about Muslim immigrants and 
their religious practices on one hand and the political contexts in which 
they live on the other. However, we are under no illusion that our research 
design has obvious limitations with regard to causal identification—a fate 
we share with most comparative politics scholars interested in the effects of 
institutions on political outcomes (Pzreworski, 2009; Rodden, 2009). As 
we cannot randomly assign citizens to political contexts, all we are left with 
is a discussion of potential threats to inference and the assumptions we 
make.
First, we seek to get a handle on potential confounding by controlling for 
all available cultural, economic, and political variables we could think of that 
could be associated with both state support of religion and anti-Muslim senti-
ment. This is done in the Robustness and Further Analyses section. Second, 
we believe we can rule out self-selection effects where citizens pre-disposed 
to religious intolerance would seek to live in certain cantons but not others. 
Although such processes are plausible within cantons—say in the choice of 
rural versus urban living area or particular neighborhoods—we find it 
unlikely that citizens self-select into larger sub-national regions based on 
their views toward Muslims. Third, and most problematic in our view, it is 
clear that institutions are endogenous and always the result of policy pro-
cesses that take into account the opinions of the citizens. Although we have 
no solution to this problem given the nature of the data available to us, we 
have already seen above that sub-national state support of religion has been 
extremely stable over the decade preceding the time of our analysis. As insti-
tutions evolve slowly, we would argue that this institutional status quo is the 
result of earlier political conflicts and is hardly affected by current debates 
over Muslim immigration. Although we are aware of these limitations, given 
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the current state of the debate, we still find the results presented in the follow-
ing section highly suggestive and worthy of discussion.
Results
To accommodate the hierarchical structure of our data as well as the ordinal 
scale of our attitudinal measures, in Figure 4, we estimate hierarchical-
ordered probit models (Gelman & Hill, 2007). We start our analyses with 
simple varying intercept specifications that relate a canton’s level of state 
support of religion to respondent’s attitudes toward Muslim while controlling 
for variables at the individual and cantonal level. We run separate models of 
this form for each of the attitudinal items6 and estimate them in a Bayesian 
framework.7 To aid the comparison of coefficients, we standardized them by 
two standard deviations (except for dummies; Gelman & Hill, 2007) and 
present them in graphs instead of tables (Kastellec & Leoni, 2007). We report 
posterior means and 90% highest probability density (HPD) regions, the 
Figure 4. Posterior means and 90% HPDs of three Bayesian hierarchical-ordered 
probit models.
The item “Too many Muslims” has been reversed so that all dependent variables refer to 
positive attitudes toward Muslims. Reference category for religious denomination is “None.” 
All variables, except for dummies, have been standardized by two standard deviations. Based 
on un-informative priors and 2,000 MCMC iterations. See Table 4 in the online appendix for 
full numerical results. HPDs = highest posterior densities; SVP = Swiss People’s Party; MCMC 
= Markov Chain Monte Carlo.
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Bayesian equivalent to regressions coefficients and confidence intervals. Full 
tables with results can be found in the online appendix.
Turning to the individual characteristics, first, we find that they behave 
similarly across the three survey items. The most important predictor for atti-
tudes toward Muslims is political ideology in terms of the left–right scale. It 
is clearly negative and bounded away from zero. People who lean to the right 
are more likely to agree that there are too many Muslims in Switzerland (pos-
terior mean of −0.89 and 90% HPD [−1.00, −0.76]), and less likely to agree 
that they should have the right to wear headscarves (−0.75 [−0.87, −0.63]) or 
to build minarets (−1.16 [−1.29, −1.01]). The same pattern applies to respon-
dents who feel close to the SVP, although the negative effects are somewhat 
weaker (too many Muslims: −0.61 [−0.78, −0.45], headscarf: −0.38 [−0.54, 
−0.23], minarets: −0.75 [−0.93, −0.56]). Higher education is related to more 
positive evaluations of the presence and rights of Muslims (too many 
Muslims: 0.55 [0.44, 0.66], headscarf: 0.38 [0.27, 0.50], minarets: 0.57 [0.46, 
0.68]). Respondents from urban areas have more favorable attitudes toward 
Muslim immigration (0.12 [0.00, 0.25]) and the right to build minarets (0.19 
[0.05, 0.32]) but do not differ from respondents living in rural areas with 
regard to their attitude toward the Muslim headscarf. Interestingly, individual 
religiosity and religious belonging is not associated with attitudes toward 
Muslims in statistical reliable ways. Although older respondents tend to agree 
that there are too many Muslims in the country (−0.39 [−0.51, −0.28]), they 
do not differ from the younger generations with regard to views on the rights 
this religious minority should enjoy. Men and women generally do not differ 
in their attitudes toward Muslims.
With regard to contextual characteristics at the level of the Swiss cantons, 
we find that the share of the Muslim population in the canton stands in a 
mixed relation to citizens’ attitudes. Although it is related to the view that 
there are too many Muslims in the country (−0.13 [−0.25, 0.00], it is also the 
case that higher the share of Muslims in the canton are related to a friendlier 
attitude toward the headscarf (0.26 [0.14, 0.37]). However, we do not find a 
statistical reliable effect for Muslims’ rights to build minarets. Compared 
with this demographic factor, what role do political institutions play? The 
general cantonal integration regime is only related to the population’s evalu-
ation of the wearing of the headscarf, where more open and liberal regimes 
tend to produce more critical evaluations (−0.13 [−0.25, −0.01]). With regard 
to the views regarding the number of Muslims in Switzerland and Muslims’ 
rights to build minarets, we found no reliable differences between integration 
regimes (although for the latter it is a close call). These are notable findings, 
given the emphasis the literature puts on religious demography and general 
immigration and integration regimes.
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More important than religious demography and the general integration 
policy in a canton are the prevalent institutions of religious regulation and in 
particular the support of religion by the government. Higher scores on the 
Religious Support Index are associated with the feeling that the number of 
Muslims is too high (−0.24 [−0.37, −0.10]). And, although the HPD of state 
support of religion just includes the null for the respondents’ attitudes toward 
the headscarf (−0.09 [−0.21, 0.03]),8 people in cantons with supportive reli-
gious regulation of the majority religion tend to hold more restrictive views 
on the Muslims’ right to build minarets (−0.15 [−0.28, −0.01]).
As coefficients of ordered probit models are hard to interpret in substan-
tive terms, we plot predicted probabilities (along with 90% HPDs) of agree-
ing “somewhat” or “totally” with the survey items, depending on the scores 
of the Religious Support Index in Figure 5. All other continuous explanatory 
variables are fixed at their means and the dummies refer to being female and 
Figure 5. Predicted probabilities (along with 90% HPDs) of agreeing “somewhat” 
or “totally” with the survey items, depending on the scores of the Religious 
Support Index.
Based on the Bayesian hierarchical-ordered probit models reported in Table 4 in the online 
appendix. All continuous explanatory variables are fixed at their means and the dummies 
refer to being female, not feeling close to the SVP, urban living area, and being Catholic. The 
little gray strips at the bottom show the empirical distribution of religious support across the 
cantons (slightly jittered). HPDs = highest posterior densities; MCMC = Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo; SVP = Swiss People’s Party.
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Catholic, but not feeling close to the SVP. Contrasting the observed minimum 
index score of 8 with the maximum of 14 reduces the positive evaluation of 
number of Muslims in the canton from 32% (90% HPD [27, 38]) to a mere 
19% [13, 25]. This is less than two thirds and, therefore, evidence of a sub-
stantial institutional effect. For attitudes toward Muslim women’s right to 
wear a headscarf, the respective difference is only around 6 points on the 
probability scale and not statistically reliable. With regard to the right to build 
minarets, we find a difference of 9 points, from 36% [31, 41] to 27% [20, 34]. 
Again, this is an effect of considerable size. What citizens think about Muslim 
immigration and the accommodation of Muslim religious rights is clearly and 
powerfully related to the institutional status quo in which they find 
themselves.
Robustness and Further Analyses
Needless to say, these findings need further checking. Concerns regarding the 
robustness of our results are most likely related to the operationalization of 
our key explanatory variable, further potentially confounding factors, and 
sensitivity to influential outliers. Also, it is conceivable that there is effect 
heterogeneity, that is, that religious policy affects subgroups in the population 
only. We address all of these concerns in turn.
Validity of the Religious Support Index
A first point of criticism that frequently surfaces in discussion is directed at 
the validity of the index we use as key explanatory variable. As the Religious 
Support Index adds up a variety of different items, it could be questionable 
whether it adequately captures the theoretical concept of interest and gives 
enough weight to truly relevant aspects of supportive religious regulation or, 
conversely, gives too much weight to irrelevant ones. Unfortunately, the lit-
erature provides little guidance in this matter and there is “a relatively cata-
strophic failure of experts to agree” on what those truly relevant items may 
be (Fox, 2011, p. 32). We therefore test the robustness of our results by re-
running all our models 100 more times, randomly varying the weighting 
scheme of the index each time and recording the change in coefficients size 
and uncertainty (see Figure 5 in the online appendix). This random weight-
ing scheme is informed by and thus reflects the variation in expert opinion.9 
However, our test shows that the substantial finding on the role of state sup-
port of religion for citizens’ attitudes toward Muslims does not depend on 
any specific weighting and/or conceptualization of supportive religious 
regulation.
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As a further test and to get a better understanding about which particular 
religious policies are responsible for the effects of state support of religion 
on attitudes toward Muslims, we ran additional models that included single 
items of the Religious Support Index separately in the equations (see Figure 
6 in the online appendix).10 Out of the 11 religious policies that varied over 
the cantons, only four seem to really drive the results and influence citizens’ 
attitudes regarding Muslims and their rights. First, where regional laws 
place restrictions on certain activities during religious holidays, citizens 
believe that there are too many Muslims in the country (−0.24 [−0.39, 
−0.07]) and tend to oppose Muslims’ right to construct minarets with a pos-
terior probability of 89% (−0.11 [−0.26, 0.04]). Second, the same influence 
on public opinion arises from systems of church taxes. Where the govern-
ment collects taxes on behalf of religious organizations, people are more 
likely to say there are too many Muslims (−0.20 [−0.35, −0.05]) and that 
they should not be allowed to build minarets (−0.16 [−0.28, −0.03]). Third, 
with a posterior probability of 94%, religious education in public schools is 
related to the regional share of people who think there are too many Muslims 
in the country (−0.30 [−0.60, 0.02]). Finally, with a posterior probability of 
93%, citizens of cantons with religious symbols on their flag are more likely 
to oppose the right to build minarets (−0.14 [−0.30, 0.02]). Interestingly, we 
see no reliable coefficients for the various items referring to the financial 
support of religious organizations.11
In other words, institutional effects on citizens’ attitudes toward Muslims 
stem from mostly cultural aspects of religious regulation that relate to the 
upholding of a collective identity (flag, religious holidays, and religious edu-
cation in public school) and/or that are highly visible to the general public 
(such as church taxes). In contrast, the many intricacies of church funding are 
probably not known to large parts of the population. Although they may well 
define crucial opportunity structures for religious organizations and actors, 
they do not affect the people’s sense of religious–cultural identity and, thus, 
their views of the Muslim minority.
Alternative Explanatory Factors
A further concern that could be raised regards explanatory factors that have 
not been included in the original model specification but potentially affect 
both state support of religion and attitudes toward Muslims. Figure 7 in the 
online appendix, therefore, presents the coefficients of the Religious Support 
Index when we additionally control for further structural, cultural, and eco-
nomic factors discussed in the relevant literature, along with the coefficients 
for these control variables. In particular, we consider the increase in the 
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regional share of Muslims between 1990 and 2010, the share of Catholics in 
the canton, the language region, vote share for the SVP as well as regional 
unemployment rates, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, economic 
inequality, and the degree or urbanization (see Figure 7 in the online appen-
dix). All of the results remain robust. An exception could be the model 
explaining attitudes toward Muslims’ right to build minarets, where once we 
control for inequality, the posterior intervals just include the null (−0.13 
[−0.28, 0.01]). But the posterior probability of a negative effect of state sup-
port of religion is still 93%. This hardly jeopardizes the general findings. 
Quite to the contrary, we now even find reliable coefficients for the effect 
state support of religion on attitudes toward Muslim women’s right to wear 
the headscarf in public (−0.13 [−0.26, .01]; posterior probability <0: 94%). In 
addition, if we control for the increase in regional Muslim population 1990-
2010 or for the share of Catholics in the canton, supportive religious regula-
tion is related to more negative attitudes to the headscarf (−0.13 [−0.25, 
0.01], posterior probability <0: 94%, and −0.20 [−0.34, −0.05], respectively). 
These findings further strengthen our theoretical argument and add to the 
empirical evidence presented in the main models.
Potentially Influential Outliers
As with 26 Swiss cantons, we are dealing with a relatively small number of 
contextual units only; single cases can quickly exert a large influence on our 
results. In each of the three model equations, we therefore checked for poten-
tially influential outliers, relying on a multilevel equivalent of Cook’s D > 4 
/ J as a criterion, where J is the number of cantons (Van der Meer, Te 
Grotenhuis, & Pelzer, 2010). However, only the canton of Zurich had a criti-
cal value in the “right to build minarets” model (Cook’s D of 0.22). Excluding 
this observation from the model does not alter our results in any substantial 
way, and the coefficient for the Religious Support Index remains virtually 
unchanged (−0.15 [−0.27, −0.01]).
Effect Heterogeneity: Cross-Level Interactions
As a final test, we explore the possibility that supportive religious policies 
have different impacts on different groups in the population. In particular, it 
is conceivable that religious people react differently to the institutional con-
text of religious regulation than the secular and that there is some effect varia-
tion across religious denominations. To accommodate this theoretical idea, 
we expand our model to a varying intercept varying slope specification by 
allowing the coefficient for individual religiosity (i.e., church attendance and 
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religious denomination) to vary over cantons and modeling it with the 
Religious Support Index. Interestingly, we find that state support of religion 
does not affect the attitudes of religious people more or less than of seculars 
(see Figure 8 in the online appendix). This holds for all three survey items 
and for both the attendance measure and the religious denomination dum-
mies. In general, there seems to be a broad overarching consensus among the 
religious and the secular as well as across denominations when it comes to 
attitudes toward Muslims and their rights.
Conclusion
Political conflicts over Muslim immigration, the religious rights of this 
minority group, and the public display of their religious symbols have 
advanced to central challenges in almost all West European democracies 
(Bader, 2007; Minkenberg, 2008; Monsma & Soper, 2009). The 2009 Swiss 
ban of the minarets is one of the most striking examples of this recent 
development and clearly illustrates the crucial role of public attitudes in the 
accommodation of Islam in Europe. Understanding citizens’ fears of 
Muslim immigration, their dislike for Muslim religious practices, and their 
opposition to Muslim religious rights is, therefore, essential for our under-
standing of the democratic challenges in Europe, the quality of modern 
immigration societies, and the role of religion in liberal democracy more 
generally.
We have proposed a new explanation by looking at the political context of 
this new religious intolerance and sought to demonstrate that the institutional 
status quo of religious regulation plays an important role in shaping citizens’ 
views on Muslim immigration and the accommodation of Muslim religious 
rights. The empirical results broadly support our argument and contradict 
previous ones in the literature (Fetzer & Soper, 2005; Helbling, 2014; 
Koopmans, 2013). Analyzing the effects of religious regulation at the sub-
national level in Switzerland allowed us for the first time to compare a rela-
tively large number of political contexts and to get closer to where immigration 
issues actually matter. We have seen that when the political, social, and cul-
tural life of a canton is defined by strong references to religious tradition, citi-
zens perceive Muslim immigrants as a threat to their way of life and react 
with animosity to their practices and demands.
These findings contribute to several debates in the literature. Following 
recent work on attitudes toward immigration, our article emphasizes the role 
of political institutions next to and above demographic or economic factors 
(e.g., Schlueter et al., 2013; Wright, 2011). At the same time, it underlines 
how important it is to develop more specific arguments to understand hostile 
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attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. On one hand, Muslims can be consid-
ered as just another immigrant group. Various studies have shown that some 
of the classic explanatory factors help us understand why they are resented. 
On the other hand, however, the religious claims of this particular immigrant 
group pose completely new challenges for Western democracies. Muslims 
are also considered a religious–cultural threat in societies that are far from 
secular and whose public institutions and collective identities are intimately 
related to historical religious traditions. Accordingly, the way religion is reg-
ulated is more important in the explanation of attitudes toward Muslims than 
integration regimes.
More generally, the argument proposed in this article allows us to connect 
the study of immigration to the study of religion. Our finding is in line with 
cross-national studies on religious discrimination (Fox & Akbaba, 2013, 
2014) and extends the results of the economy of religion model by Grim and 
Finke (2007, 2011) who, like us, argued that religious regulation leads to 
more social hostilities toward religious minorities. Although they focus on 
the effects of restrictive religious policies, we show that even more benevo-
lent religious regulation may affect negatively on the way religious minori-
ties are viewed and treated. This is consistent with the religious discrimination 
literature and we confirm this finding with survey data from a single country. 
Interestingly, this occurs through more diffuse cultural mechanisms. Although 
we found no effects of financial or material support for religious organiza-
tions or actors which could structure their incentives to harm religious minor-
ities, it is the cultural aspects of religious regulation which relate to the 
traditional collective identity and are highly visible to the general public that 
shape attitudes toward Muslims.
Finally, our results have important implications for the renewed debate 
on the role of religion in modern democracies. Although it was long believed 
that democracy presupposes a separation of religion and the state, a recent 
wave of studies has called this liberal notion into question by showing that 
not only is strict separation virtually absent in Western democracies except 
the United States (Fox, 2006, 2008) but that supportive religious regulation 
in terms of the identification with majority religion may be irrelevant if not 
even beneficial to levels of democracy (Driessen, 2010). Our results contra-
dict this view and suggest that it may have been too optimistic as even 
benevolent forms of religious regulation may have unintended negative con-
sequences for democracy. This detrimental effect on democracy runs via the 
attitudes of citizens. Where states support majority religions such important 
democratic values as religious tolerance, liberty, and equal treatment may 
suffer which in the end harms liberal democracy.
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Notes
 1. An alternative explanation for attitudes toward immigrants is based on social 
identity theory (Tajfel, 1981, 1982).
 2. In addition, a smaller and more recent group of Muslim immigrants are politi-
cal refugees and asylum seekers from former Yugoslavia, the Middle East, and 
North Africa (Gianni, 2005).
 3. These figures are based on our own coding for the year 2011 based on the 
Religion and State Project 2 (RAS2) scheme designed by Fox (2008, 2011). Fox 
provides numbers up to the year 2008. Using his data, the empirical range of 
Religious Support Index in European countries is from 3 (Estonia) to 13 (Czech 
Republic and Greece). Translated to the national level, our comparison would 
roughly amount to comparing societies such as Belgium or Poland (8) with 
Czech Republic or Greece.
 4. The following items are measured: political and voting rights, cantonal provi-
sions of immigrants’ commission, access to nationality (residence length and 
costs), integration requirements for naturalization and implementation thereof, 
access to employment in cantonal administration, dispositions toward Islamic 
burials, recognition of minorities religions, housing requirements for family 
reunification, and anti-discrimination regulations.
 5. According to Manatschal (2012), there were hardly any policy changes between 
2004 and 2008. Moreover, we are not aware of any major reforms between 2008 
and 2011 (date of survey).
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 6. We opted for a separate analysis of the three survey items to gain more detailed 
insights. However, combining the items to a common scale using an item 
response theory (IRT) model leads to the same substantive conclusions.
 7. We rely on the Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation algorithms imple-
mented in the R package MCMC Generalised Linear Mixed Models (MCMCglmm; 
Hadfield, 2010). A fully Bayesian analysis requires the specification of priors for 
all unknown parameters. We used non-informative normal priors ~N(0, 108) for the 
fixed effect parameters and inverse Wishart priors ~W−1(1, 0.002) for the variance 
component. For each model, one chain of the simulation algorithm was run for 
250,000 iterations, where the first 150,000 simulations were discarded as “burn-
in.” The remaining iterations were thinned by a factor of 50, leaving 2,000 MCMC 
simulations for inference. Inspection of graphical diagnostics as well as formal 
convergence tests shows no signs of non-convergence (see Gill, 2008 for more 
details on MCMC diagnostics). Posterior coefficient estimates were rescaled by 
dividing by √2 and the variance component by dividing by 2 (Hadfield, 2012).
 8. The posterior probability that the coefficient of state support is smaller than zero 
(i.e., that there is a negative effect) is still around 88%.
 9. To let actual expert opinion guide the random weighting, we draw on the results 
in Fox (2011), who reports the judgments of 17 experts in the field. Each expert 
was asked to rate all of the items included in the index according to their impor-
tance for the connection between religion and politics as well as their signifi-
cance in influencing people’s lives. From these expert evaluations, we are able 
to calculate the probability that any one item is judged as being highly important 
or as unimportant. Based on these probabilities, we then randomly assigned a 
weighting factor of 2 to important and of 0 to unimportant items and repeated 
this procedure 100 times.
10. Of course, with so many tests, it could be that results turn out by pure chance, 
without anything substantial going on. But the consistency by which items mat-
ter across the models suggests that this is rather unlikely.
11. One exception could be the funding of religious schools which is related to less 
acceptance of the right to wear a headscarf with a posterior probability of 76% 
(−0.13 [−0.29, 0.03]).
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